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Executive Summary 
Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a 
radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive 
material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive 
material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" 
that are not nuclear detonations but are conventional explosives designed to spread radioactive material 
(National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also 
could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, 
including waterways and water supply systems. 
This document, Volume 2 of PNNL-15163, is an assessment of the radiological instrumentation needs for 
detection of radiological or nuclear terrorism in support of decisions to treat contaminated wastewater or 
to bypass the West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP) and in support of radiation protection of the workforce, 
the public, and the infrastructure of this publicly-owned treatment works (POTW).  
Two broad categories of scenarios were considered in Volume 1. The first category includes events that 
may be suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a dirty bomb in downtown Seattle. The 
explosion would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., natural gas, industrial explosion, or 
terrorist RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to quickly detect 
the radioisotopes previously listed, assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if 
possible) detrimental effects resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of 3 to 4 hours 
might be available before any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
The second category includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples 
of such a scenario include the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the 
sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging 
apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be carried to a treatment plant. Other 
scenarios include a terrorist deliberately putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. 
Alternatively, a botched terrorism preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering 
wastewater without anyone's knowledge. Drinking water supplies, bottled or packaged beverages, and 
foodstuffs may also be contaminated, with the result that some or most of the radioactivity ends up in 
wastewater. In some of these scenarios, the first evidence that an incident has occurred may be detection 
of radioactive material in wastewater. 
Fixed radiation detection instrumentation should be deployed in a defense-in-depth system that provides 
1) early warning of significant radioactive material on the way to the WPTP, including identification of 
the radionuclide(s) and estimates of the soluble concentrations, with a floating detector located in the wet 
well at the Interbay Pump Station and telemetered via secure wideband communications to all authorized 
locations, 2) monitoring at strategic locations within the plant, including  
a)  the pipe beyond the hydraulic ram in the bar screen room 
b)  above the collection funnels in the fine grit facility 
c)  in the sampling tank in the raw sewage pump room 
d)  downstream of the concentration facilities that produce 6% blended and concentrated 
biosolids. 
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Engineering challenges exist for these applications. Explosion-proof, corrosion resistant housings and 
temperature compensation must be designed for detectors. Cable-length challenges may exist for 
delivering power to detectors and retrieving required signals out of potentially explosive and corrosive 
environments. It will be necessary to engineer floating detectors that cannot become dams or become 
excessively fouled with grease between reasonable service intervals, and that can rise and fall with 
varying wastewater levels and flow rates. It is also necessary to deploy both ultra-sensitive detectors to 
provide early warning and identification and detectors capable of functioning in high-dose rate 
environments that are likely under some scenarios, capable of functioning from 10 microrems per hour 
(background) up to 1000 rems per hour, a full eight orders of magnitude (a factor of 100,000,000). While 
such instrumentation exists for other applications, all of this engineering will require deploying 
prototypes and perhaps dealing with unforeseen complications.  
Software supporting fixed spectroscopic detectors would be developed to provide prompt, reliable, and 
simple interpretations of spectroscopic outputs that are of use to operators and decision-makers. Software 
to provide scientists and homeland security personnel with sufficient technical detail for identification, 
quantification, waste management decisions, and for the inevitable forensic and attribution needs must be 
developed. Such software is not an off-the-shelf product as of March 2005 but it is expected that, with 
sufficient resources and collaboration between government agencies, scientists, and vendors, it can be 
specified and developed within two years or less. 
Computational modeling using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software has demonstrated that 
useful detection capabilities can be deployed. In particular, any of the isotopes examined can be detected 
at levels between 0.01 and 0.1 microcurie (µCi) per gallon. Thus, a 1 Ci source dissolved in 10 million 
gallons of water could be detected within minutes. 
In addition to fixed instruments, general purpose instruments that can be used to determine the nature and 
extent of radioactive contamination and measure radiation levels for purposes of protecting personnel and 
members of the public should be available to WTD personnel. One or more portable radioisotope 
identifiers (RIIDs) should be available to WTD personnel. Small, portable battery-powered personal 
radiation monitors should be widely available to WTD personnel. The personal monitors can be used for 
personal and group radiation protection decisions, and to alert management to the need to get expert 
backup. 
All uses of radiological instrumentation will require training and periodic retraining of personnel, as well 
as periodic calibration and maintenance of instruments. Routine “innocent” alarms will occur due to 
medical radionuclides that are legally discharged into sanitary sewers on a daily basis. Innocent alarms 
may also be triggered by WTD workers who have recently been treated with medical radioisotopes. 
Instrumentation must provide signals that distinguish between routine medical discharges and off-normal 
occurrences that are due to malicious acts or undetected accidents. Operators and others who deal with 
instrument signals must be prepared to deal with innocent but real alarms, while being vigilant for alarms 
indicating malicious or other serious discharges. 
It is recommended that the King County Wastewater Treatment Division seek Homeland Security 
resources to become the model POTW in the U.S. to design, deploy, and test such radiological 
instrumentation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In the United States there are no identified cases in which radioactive materials in sewage 
systems are a threat to the health and safety of publicly-owned treatment works (POTW) 
workers or the general public. However, there have been a small number of facilities where 
elevated levels of man-made radioactive materials were detected. Based upon this past 
experience, there is a concern that radioactive material could concentrate in sewage 
sludge and ash and could pose a threat to the health and safety of workers or the public. 
                                               (Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003).  
Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a 
radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive 
material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive 
material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" 
that are not nuclear detonations but are conventional explosives designed to spread radioactive material 
(National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also 
could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, 
including waterways and water supply systems. 
This document, Volume 2 of PNNL-15163, is an assessment of the radiological instrumentation needs for 
detection of radiological or nuclear terrorism in support of decisions to treat contaminated wastewater or 
to bypass the West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP), and in support of radiation protection of the 
workforce, the public, and the infrastructure of this publicly-owned treatment works (POTW).  
Volume 1 of PNNL-15163 (Strom 2005) reviewed the basics of radiation, radioactive material, and 
radiation protection. Two broad categories of scenarios were considered in Volume 1. The first category 
includes events that may be suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a dirty bomb in downtown 
Seattle. The explosion would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., natural gas, industrial 
explosion, or terrorist RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to 
quickly detect the radioisotopes listed in Volume 1 (60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 226Ra, plutonium, and 241Am), 
assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if possible) detrimental effects 
resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of 3 to 4 hours might be available before 
any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
The second category includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples 
of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the 
sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging 
apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be carried to a treatment plant. Other 
scenarios might include a terrorist deliberately putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. 
Alternatively, a botched terrorism preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering 
wastewater without anyone's knowledge. Drinking water supplies, bottled or packaged beverages, and 
foodstuffs may also be contaminated, with the result that some or most of the radioactivity ends up in 
wastewater. In some of these scenarios, the first evidence that an incident has occurred may be detection 
of radioactive material in wastewater. 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff made two visits to WTD facilities serving 
downtown Seattle and points north to determine strategic locations for fixed detector placement, and to 
refine the radiological risk assessment (Volume 1 of PNNL-15163, Strom 2005, referred to as “Vol. 1 in 
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this report). Engineering constraints on detector design and locations were determined. Vendors were 
contacted to discuss the availability of the types of equipment required. Monte Carlo calculations were 
performed to predict detector capabilities. Needs and uses of portable radiation detection equipment 
available on the state of Washington approved equipment list were assessed. 
While Volume 1 covered only briefly the event of the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND), 
accidents at nuclear reactors or sabotage of spent nuclear fuel shipment, the instrumentation described in 
Volume 2 has significant capabilities for responding to such events. 
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2.0 Types and Features of Radiation Measuring Instruments 
This section provides background information on instruments that are of interest in the context of 
detecting and responding to radiological terrorism. It is important to recognize that RDEs can be silent, 
that is, radioactive material is silently and secretly dispersed via deliberate contamination of food, 
beverage, water, air, crops, or elsewhere in the environment. This possibility requires special detection 
and identification capabilities. 
Instruments are grouped into four categories: instruments that detect radiation, instruments that measure 
radiation levels and amounts (dose-rate and dose), instruments that identify radioisotopes, and 
instruments that can measure how much of a radioisotope is present (activity or activity concentration).  
2.1 Instrument Capabilities  
Various kinds of detector and associated electronics have particular strengths and weaknesses. In the 
sections that follow, instruments are categorized as having 
• high sensitivity for rapid detection 
• good accuracy for measurement of radiation levels 
• capability to function in and measure intense radiation levels 
• capability to identify radioactive materials, or 
• capability to measure the activity of known radioactive materials. 
2.1.1 High Sensitivity for Rapid Detection  
Some instruments, such as those employing Geiger-Müller (GM) detectors, are very sensitive to alpha, 
beta, and gamma radiation. With modest training, users of such instruments can distinguish among the 
three types of radiation. However, GM detectors are much less suitable for accurate measurement of 
radiation levels. 
Other instruments, like the radiation “pagers” used by law enforcement agencies, are quite sensitive to 
gamma radiation, are small, portable, rugged, and have long battery life. Some have built-in alarming 
capability to warn the user when a certain radiation level is exceeded. They, too, are not accurate for 
measurement of radiation levels, and should not be relied on for that purpose.  
Detectors employing large volume plastic scintillators, such as the radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that 
are deployed at U.S. land border crossings, are extremely sensitive to gamma radiation, but have very 
limited capabilities for identifying which radioactive material is emitting the radiation. Such detectors 
also have significant neutron detection capabilities for the detection of special nuclear materials that have 
the potential to be used to make an improvised nuclear device (homemade atomic bomb). 
As of March, 2005, development of highly sensitive RPMs with spectroscopic capability is underway in 
the U.S. and elsewhere.  
2.1.2 Accurate Measurement of Radiation Levels (Radiation Dose Rates)  
Portable instruments are available for the accurate measurement of radiation levels (radiation dose rates) 
from a variety of gamma and x radiation sources, in units such as millirems per hour (mrem/hour) or 
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rems/hour. Such instruments are generally of the air ionization type, or use a plastic scintillator coupled to 
a photomultiplier tube. 
2.1.3 Measurement of Intense Radiation Levels 
Under one of the scenarios in Vol. 1, it is possible that radioactive material in the form of pellets of 60Co 
may reconcentrate at one or more locations in the system. Also, an intact radioactive source of high 
strength (high activity), such as an industrial radiography source or brachytherapy source, may find its 
way into the system. In particular, reconcentration may occur in the grit facility or the rock box in the bar 
screen room. Such an event could lead to dangerously high radiation levels requiring prompt local 
evacuation to at least 100 feet away. 
2.1.4 Identification of Radioactive Material 
Characteristics of radionuclides of concern are listed in Table 1 (reproduced from Vol. 1). These are of 
particular interest because they are plentiful in relatively large amounts. Half-lives and principal radiation 
types are shown. The “D-values” are internationally-recognized “dangerous” amounts of these 
radionuclides (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2003) in units of curies or terabecquerels 
(TBq), where 1 Ci = 0.037 TBq. For the most common chemical forms of these radionuclides, note the 
incredibly small mass associated with a dangerous amount of radioactivity. As shown in the last three 
columns, these radioactive materials may have industrial, medical, or defense uses. 
Table 1. List of radionuclides of concern. Some emit more than one kind of radiation. D-values are 
threshold values for dangerous amounts in curies, terabecquerels, and milligrams (mg) if the radionuclide 
is not diluted with non-radioactive material. Use or origin indicates where the radionuclides may be in 
use. 
   Radiation D-value Use or Origin 
Radionuclide Symbol Half-life al
ph
a 
be
ta
 
ga
m
m
a 
Ci TBq mg In
du
st
ria
l 
M
ed
ic
al
 
D
ef
en
se
 
cobalt-60 60Co   5 years  β γ 0.8 0.03 0.7 x x  
strontium-90 90Sr  28 years  β  30 1 450 x x  
molybdenum-99 99Mo 66 hours  β γ 8 0.3 0.017  x  
iodine-131 131I 8 days  β γ 5 0.2 0.04  x  
cesium-137 137Cs 30 years  β γ 3 0.1 44 x x  
iridium-192 192Ir 75 days  β γ 2 0.08 0.2 x x  
radium-226 226Ra 1600 years α β γ 1 0.04 1,000 x   
uranium U 4.5 billion years α β weak   - x  x 
americium-241 241Am 432 years α  γ 2 0.06 580 x  x 
plutonium Pu 24,000 years α β weak 2 0.06 - x  x 
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Identification of various radionuclides, such as 60Co, 90Sr + 90Y, 137Cs, 192Ir, 226Ra, 239Pu, and 241Am 
requires gamma spectroscopy equipment, usually based on sodium iodide (NaI) detectors, high purity 
germanium (HPGe) detectors, cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe) detectors, or other solid-state or 
scintillation detectors. The outputs of such detectors are fed into multichannel analyzers that provide 
“color vision” for gamma and x radiation. Each radionuclide listed above has a particular gamma 
signature that is identifiable by gamma spectroscopy. The gamma signatures are distinct from those of 
common medical radionuclides like 67Ga, 99mTc, 99Mo, 131I, and 201Tl. The 90Sr+90Y pair, while not 
emitting gamma radiation, does produce some x radiation that can be detected using gamma spectroscopy 
equipment. 
Some radionuclides, such as 238Pu, emit virtually no gamma radiation and very little x radiation, and can 
only be detected by their emissions of α-particles. Such radionuclides are only hazardous if inhaled or 
ingested, and are not likely to affect health of WTD workers. 
2.1.5 Measurement of Amount (Activity) or Concentration (Activity per Unit Volume) of 
Radioactive Material 
One must know what radioactive material is present in order to measure the activity (in curies, Ci; or 
becquerels, Bq; see Volume 1) or volume concentration (in curies per gallon, Ci/gal; or becquerels per 
cubic meter, Bq/m3) of a radioactive material. Additionally, one must know where the material is with 
respect to the detector. If the sample to be measured is in a small vial, one can put it on or near a detector 
and have a good idea what the geometric efficiency is. On the other hand, if the sample is dissolved or 
suspended in a large volume of water, sensitivity is significantly diminished for a detector near the 
surface. For a dispersed sample, surrounding a detector with it provides the best compromise for 
maximizing sensitivity for measuring the activity or volume concentration of a radioisotope  
2.2 Standards 
Radiation detection instruments should meet applicable standards, such as the recent ANSI N42 series 
(American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d). 
2.3 Portability 
Radiation detection instruments can be made to be portable, “luggable,” or require fixed installation. 
Radiation pagers can be clipped to a belt or hand-held. Other survey instruments are hand-held, such as a 
“pancake” GM detector connected to a hand-held ratemeter or scaler. Still others, such as hand-held 
radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs), are more appropriately termed luggable, since their weight and size make 
them a burden for use over an 8-hour day. 
Portability is not of interest for fixed-installation instruments that function as remote detectors. 
2.4 Power and Battery Life 
Some instruments require standard 117 VAC electric power, while others may operate on rechargeable or 
disposable batteries. 
Instruments requiring computers, such as gamma spectroscopic systems, should have uninterruptible 
power supplies (UPSs) that can power the system during brief power outages. 
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2.5 Protection from Radioactive Contamination and Capability to Be 
Decontaminated 
Radioactive contamination is just like any other kind of dirt, with the additional property of being 
radioactive. If radiological instruments become contaminated with radioactive material, that is, dirty, they 
will continuously sense the presence of the radioactive material on the instrument, raising the background 
indication of the instrument. 
In a wastewater environment, there may also be biohazardous materials present that can contaminate an 
instrument. 
Thus it is vitally important to keep instruments, and any detectors attached to them, free of radioactive 
contamination. This may be done by using plastic sheaths or other removable or strippable coatings. 
2.6 Operating Environment Limitations 
Instruments for permanent placement in WTD facilities, such as a wet well, bar screen room, raw sewage 
pump room, fine grit facility, or biosolids facility, may need to be housed in waterproof, explosion-proof, 
corrosion resistant housings. Temperature stability of detectors can be addressed by insulation and 
installation of low-power thermostatically-controlled heaters to keep temperature constant and above 
operating facility temperature.  
Instrument housings in contact with wastewater must be durable and easily cleaned of layers of grease or 
other material that may build up. 
2.7 Cable Length 
The length of cabling for power, control, and data is a critical problem for instrumentation located in 
explosive, corrosive, or wet areas. Currently, options are being explored to manage this problem.  
2.8 Telemetry 
Some of the output information for fixed instrumentation may be amenable to transmission via a 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, but secure wideband communications 
capability to interface through a hardware firewall with the Internet would be highly desirable, permitting 
authorized personnel at remote locations to access, read out, diagnose, and control the systems. 
GPS capability for portable systems would be highly desirable for coordinating and managing data in the 
aftermath of an RDE. 
2.9 Readouts, Displays, Alarms 
The various categories of instruments described in Section 2.1 have a variety of readout, display and 
alarm capabilities. Ideally, readouts would be very simple and would lead to pre-determined actions. 
There are opportunities for development of software and systems that minimize the need for advanced 
training in radiological matters. 
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2.10 Calibration 
All radiation detection instruments must be periodically calibrated. Most portable instruments should be 
calibrated every 6 months, and tested on various ranges. Spectroscopic instruments should have energy 
calibrations and tests with a calibration source at least every 6 months. Calibration is needed whether 
instruments are in use or not.  
2.11 Operational Checks 
All portable instruments should be put through daily operational checks with a small radioactive check 
source each day they are used. Permanently-installed radiation detectors should be checked on a periodic 
basis. The period for such checks depends on the ease of getting to the instrument to perform the checks 
and the expected reliability of the instrument in its environment. 
2.12 Maintenance 
Routine maintenance includes recharging of rechargeable batteries, and replacement of disposable 
batteries.  
For fixed instruments, inspection of cables and detector condition will be required at intervals to be 
determined from experience. 
2.13 Operator Training 
Operator training must cover routine checks and routine maintenance (e.g., changing batteries and 
cleaning), operation, and interpretation of readouts and information, as well as decisions that must be 
made based on instrument results. Operators need to be trained in contamination control and in 
decontaminating instruments and detectors that become contaminated. 
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3.0 How Radiological Instruments Can Support King County 
WTD’s Mission 
Radiological instruments can serve the following functions: 
• provide early warning of significant radioactive material in wastewater on its way to the WPTP 
• provide nearly real-time warnings within the plant of material that was not detected prior to 
reaching the plant 
• identify the radionuclides at various locations in interceptors and in the WPTP 
• determine the volume concentration (Ci/gal or Bq/m3) in wastewater 
• determine the activity in rocks, grit, rags, and biosolids 
• measure the radiation levels that workers or members of the public may be exposed to 
• warn workers of significantly elevated radiation levels 
• measure doses to workers, equipment, and microbes. 
3.1 Provide Early Warning 
Given notification an hour before contaminated wastewater arrives at the WPTP, operators can decide 
whether to bypass the plant or treat the contaminated water. Treating may be the best option in some 
cases, and these will be outlined in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan. If the decision is made to 
treat, then there are options that may arise depending on what radionuclides are involved. 
3.2 Provide Nearly Real-time Warnings within the WPTP 
Instrumentation within the plant may be very much more sensitive than instrumentation deployed in a wet 
well upstream of the plant. Nearly real-time warnings may arise from various locations within the plant, 
including the rock box, rags waste stream, grit facility, raw sewage pump area, and the thickened, blended 
sludge piping. Each path or wastestream can lead to different radiological conditions that may expose 
workers, and different risk management decisions concerning how to manage a particular waste stream. 
3.3 Identify Radionuclides  
Identification of radionuclides can lead to decisions to bypass or treat, and to invoke other options for 
waste management and worker protection. It also alerts other public agencies to the specific nature of a 
potential radiological problem. 
3.4 Determine Volume Concentrations and Activities 
Waste management decisions will depend on the activity and concentration of radioactive materials in 
various waste streams, and enable managers to predict dose rates and radiation hazards to workers and the 
public. 
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3.5 Measure Radiation Levels (Dose Rates) 
Direct radiation measurements will facilitate worker protection and enable managers to cordon off areas 
to all but essential personnel, and limit stay times in areas with high radiation levels. Additionally, dose 
rate measurements are needed to plan recovery operations. 
3.6 Warn Workers of High Radiation Levels (Dose Rates) 
In conjunction with fixed location instruments, alarming personal dosimeters can help keep workers’ 
doses as low as reasonably achievable while permitting them to work confidently in areas of low radiation 
hazard. 
3.7 Help with Forensics and Attribution 
If an RDE is the result of criminal or malicious actions, law enforcement and radiation regulatory 
agencies will immediately get involved. All of the radiation measurement results from fixed and portable 
instruments will be needed to assess the problem and guide investigations. 
3.8 Recording of Doses to Workers, Public, and the Environment 
Having radiation measurement results available, recording them, and communicating them can help 
manage fear and enhance peace of mind. Doses received on the job may later become a subject of 
litigation, and having measurement records will inevitably help with this problem
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4.0 Detection Capabilities of Fixed Radiological Instruments 
Computational research was performed to simulate the photon response of two configurations of fixed 
thallium-doped sodium iodide NaI(Tl) scintillation detectors to radionuclides suspended in wastewater for 
the purpose of determining concentrations that could be detected above background for a variety of 
medical and industrial radionuclides. 
4.1 Detectors Modeled 
Two thick crystal types, the 2 inch by 2 inch (2×2) and 3 inch by 3 inch (3×3) with a right circular 
cylinder geometry, are chosen due to availability, ruggedness, and overall energy response. Two different 
detector locations are also considered. The first has the detector sealed in a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe 
and submerged in the contaminated water. The second has the detector sealed in PVC then surrounded by 
a rubber buoy and floated atop the contaminated stream. 
The response of the detectors to various radionuclides was simulated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle 
(MCNP) computer code versions MCNP-5 (X-5 Monte Carlo Team 2004) and MCNP-X (Hendricks et al. 
2005). These computer codes allow the accurate simulation of the radiation interactions with the NaI(Tl) 
and the surrounding environment. Not included in the simulation is the response of the associated detector 
electronics (e.g., photomultiplier tube and multichannel analyzer). 
1.1 4.2 Sampling Geometry Descriptions 
Each of the NaI(Tl) detectors, 2×2 and 3×3 are represented in MCNP as simple right circular cylinders. 
The NaI(Tl) material is then surrounded by thin (0.5 mm) aluminum on the front and sides with 1-inch at 
the back to represent the effect of the photomultiplier tube on the incident radiation. This description is 
based on the specification of Canberra model 802 (www.canberra.com) detectors. 
Surrounding the aluminum clad detectors is a 0.25-inch thick 4-inch diameter PVC to seal the detectors 
from intrusion of water. This configuration with be referred to as the detector unit. 
The detector unit is then placed in two separate scenarios. The first has the detector unit submerged in 
water contained in a small PVC box, modeled after the sampling station in the raw sewage pump room at 
WPTP, shown in Figure 1. The box that was modeled was made of 1/2 in. thick PVC, 30 in. high, 22 in. 
wide, 11 in. thick, with a water depth of 24.5 in. The sampling box and detector is graphically represented 
in Figure 2 and in several views in Appendix A. 
The second scenario places the detector unit within a 60-cm (2-foot) diameter 1-inch thick spherical 
rubber buoy that could be floated in the wet well at the Interbay Pump Station, shown in Figure . This 
buoy allows the detector unit to float on top of the contaminated stream. This is graphically represented in 
Figure 4 
Figure 4. Cross section of model of floating detector. Dark blue is NaI(Tl), yellow is water, light blue is 
rubber, green is PVC, magenta is aluminum. . It is recognized that in a fielded device, part of the buoy 
would reside under the water. For this initial study assuming that the entire buoy is above water is a 
conservative assumption. The water below the floating buoy detector was taken as a cylinder with a 60 
cm radius and 60 cm deep.  
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 Figure 1. Sampling box in WPTP raw sewage pump room. Left: Side view, right: Looking downward 
into the wastewater with the overflow near the bottom of the picture. 
. 
Figure 2. Sampling box detector setup for MCNP modeling. Red is NaI(Tl), green is PVC, light blue is 
water, and dark blue is foamy water at 50% density spilling over the overflow, white is dry air, yellow is 
aluminum. 
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Figure 3. The wet well at the Interbay Pump Station. The floating detector would have to rise and fall 
with changing wastewater levels. 
 
 
Figure 4. Cross section of model of floating detector. Dark blue is NaI(Tl), yellow is water, light blue is 
rubber, green is PVC, magenta is aluminum.   
Example listings of the MCNP input files are included in Appendix A. 
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4.3 Material Description 
Several basic materials are used in the models. Table 2 gives the chemical composition and density of 
these materials. 
Table 2. Material Composition. 
Material Density (g/cc) 
Composition 
(MCNP description) Reference 
Dry Air 1.205E-3 Carbon (6000 1.24E-4 
weight fraction) 
ICRU-37, pg. 27 
  Nitrogen (7014 
0.7555267 weight 
fraction) 
 
  Oxygen (8016 0.231781 
weight fraction) 
 
  Argon (18000 
0.0012827 weight 
fraction) 
 
Aluminum 2.702 Elemental (13027 1 
atom fraction) 
CRC Handbook of 
Chemistry and 
Physics, 74th ed. 
Sodium Iodide 3.667 Sodium (11000 1 atom 
fraction) 
CRC Handbook of 
Chemistry and 
Physics, 74th ed. 
  Iodine (53000 1 atom 
fraction) 
 
Water 1 Hydrogen (1000 2 atom 
fraction) 
CRC Handbook of 
Chemistry and 
Physics, 74th ed. 
  Oxygen (8000 1 atom 
fraction) 
 
Polyvinyl Chloride 1.406 Hydrogen (1000 6 atom 
fraction) 
The Merck Index, 
11th ed. 
  Carbon (6000 4 atom 
fraction) 
 
  Chlorine (17000 2 atom 
fraction) 
 
Rubber 0.95 Hydrogen (1000 12 MatWeb for 
density of 
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Material Density (g/cc) 
Composition 
(MCNP description) Reference 
atom fraction) vulcanized natural 
rubber; 
The Merck Index, 
11th ed. For 
chemical 
composition 
  Carbon (6000 4 atom 
fraction) 
 
 
4.4 Radionuclide Source Descriptions 
There are eleven different radionuclide sources used in this study. Of these radionuclides, ten are direct 
photon emitters while only 90Sr + 90Y produces x radiation photons through bremsstrahlung. 
Of the ten photon emitters the photon emissions with an intensity greater than 0.5% were included in the 
MCNP source term. The photon spectra of these radionuclides used are given in Table 3. These spectra 
are from the NUDAT database maintained by National Nuclear Data Center, www.nndc.bnl.gov/nudat2 . 
Table 3. Photon emission spectra. 
Radionuclide 
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
Intensity 
(fraction) 
Co-60 1.173228 0.9985 
 1.332492 0.999826 
   
Mo-99 0.0405845 0.0105 
 0.018251 0.0107 
 0.366421 0.01191 
 0.018367 0.0202 
 0.777921 0.0426 
 0.140511 0.0452 
 0.181068 0.0599 
 0.7395 0.1213 
   
Tc-99m 0.020619 0.00639 
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Radionuclide 
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
Intensity 
(fraction) 
 0.018251 0.0214 
 0.018367 0.0407 
 0.140511 0.8906 
   
I-131 0.00411 0.0055 
 0.029461 0.0138 
 0.722911 0.0177 
 0.029782 0.0254 
 0.080185 0.0262 
 0.284305 0.0614 
 0.636989 0.0717 
 0.364489 0.817 
   
Cs-137 0.036378 0.00661 
 0.00447 0.009 
 0.031817 0.0196 
 0.032194 0.0358 
 0.661657 0.851 
   
Ir-192 0.075368 0.00533 
 0.4164688 0.00669 
 0.3744852 0.00726 
 0.075749 0.01025 
 0.061486 0.012 
 0.00891 0.0153 
 0.063 0.0205 
 0.065122 0.0263 
 0.4845751 0.03187 
 0.2057943 0.0334 
 0.00944 0.0396 
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Radionuclide 
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
Intensity 
(fraction) 
 0.066831 0.0446 
 0.588581 0.04517 
 0.6124621 0.0534 
 0.60441105 0.082 
 0.2959565 0.2872 
 0.30845507 0.2968 
 0.4680688 0.4781 
 0.31650618 0.8271 
   
Ra-226 0.0117 0.008 
 0.186211 0.0359 
   
Pb-214 0.25887 0.00524 
 0.83904 0.00587 
 0.089784 0.00897 
 0.78596 0.0107 
 0.0532275 0.012 
 0.08683 0.0128 
 0.087349 0.0244 
 0.074815 0.0633 
 0.241997 0.0743 
 0.077107 0.1055 
 0.0108 0.133 
 0.295224 0.193 
 0.351932 0.376 
   
Bi-214 0.0111 0.00598 
 0.07929 0.00661 
 1.58322 0.0069 
 1.38531 0.00757 
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Radionuclide 
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
Intensity 
(fraction) 
 2.11855 0.0114 
 1.66128 0.0115 
 0.806174 0.0122 
 1.4015 0.0127 
 1.28096 0.0143 
 0.665453 0.0146 
 2.44786 0.0157 
 1.15519 0.0163 
 1.509228 0.0211 
 1.84742 0.0211 
 1.40798 0.0215 
 1.729595 0.0292 
 0.934061 0.0303 
 1.377669 0.04 
 0.768356 0.0494 
 2.20421 0.0508 
 1.23811 0.0579 
 1.120287 0.151 
 1.764494 0.154 
 0.609312 0.461 
   
Am-241 0.0263448 0.024 
 0.0595412 0.359 
 0.0139 0.369 
 
The 90Sr + 90Y beta spectrum was taken from the compilation at www.doseinfo-radar.com . This site has 
compiled various beta emission spectra for direct use in MCNP. The beta spectrum used is given in 
Table 4.  
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Table 4. 90Sr + 90Y beta spectrum 
Energy (MeV) 
Intensity 
(fraction) 
5.71E-02 1.18E-01 
1.71E-01 1.23E-01 
2.86E-01 1.19E-01 
4.00E-01 1.01E-01 
5.14E-01 7.67E-02 
6.28E-01 7.08E-02 
7.42E-01 7.17E-02 
8.57E-01 7.15E-02 
9.71E-01 7.04E-02 
1.08E+00 6.85E-02 
1.20E+00 6.57E-02 
1.31E+00 6.19E-02 
1.43E+00 5.69E-02 
1.54E+00 5.07E-02 
1.66E+00 4.30E-02 
1.77E+00 3.42E-02 
1.88E+00 2.46E-02 
2.00E+00 1.50E-02 
2.11E+00 6.43E-03 
2.23E+00 1.13E-03 
 
For the floating detector case only a portion of the water immediately below the detector was used. This 
source volume was a right circular cylinder 60-cm in diameter and 60-cm thick. This volume was chosen 
based on the transmission fraction of 60Co photons (Vol. 1). By using a smaller source volume a balance 
is struck between the simulation runtime and the accurate of the result. 
4.5 Tally Description 
Simulation of the detector response is accomplished using the F8 type tally for photons. This tally 
represents the simulated detector pulses due to incident radiation, in other words the probability of an 
incident photon interacting with the NaI(Tl). This tally was modified using the Gaussian Energy 
Broadening (GEB) special tally treatment. 
20 
 
Using this treatment results in the photopeaks simulated in the detector broadening to properly represent 
that of NaI(Tl). The parameters used to define the GEB specify the full width at half maximum (FWHM) 
of the observed energy broadening in the physical detector. This treatment follows  
2cEEbaFWHM ++=  
where 
 a is 0 for this simulation 
 b is 0.05086 for this simulation 
 c is 0.30486 for this simulation 
 E is the photon energy in MeV 
The values of a, b, and c in the FWHM equation were formulated to yield a FWHM value of 7% at the 
661 keV photon energy line of 137Cs (Siciliano et al. 2004). The 7% FWHM is typical for NaI(Tl). 
Fluence information was also collected at several surfaces of the model, the outer PVC, outer aluminum, 
and the outer NaI(Tl) surfaces. While this data has been collected it currently is not used in the analysis. 
4.6 Variance Reduction 
As stated earlier, two versions of MCNP have been used for this analysis, MCNP-5 and MCNP-X. The 
reason for this is that MCNP-X allows the use of a variance reduction method known as importance 
splitting. This option is not allowed in MCNP-5 for F8 tallies at the present, and is not needed for the 
photon sources. The use of importance splitting, however, was instrumental in getting acceptable results 
with the 90Sr + 90Y bremsstrahlung source. 
The importance splitting method essentially splits each source particle into i parts at the cell boundaries. 
As a particle moves from a cell into an adjacent cell if the adjacent cell has a higher importance value the 
particle is split into the number of particles equal to the ratio of the importance values. This allows for the 
creation of particle showers to speed up convergence of the tally. A detailed discussion of this variance 
reduction method can be found in the MCNP manual (Hendricks et al. 2005). 
4.7 Results 
The MCNP results for the pulse height tally are expressed as a probability of an event depositing a 
particular amount of energy (divided into 1-keV energy bins) in the detector per nuclear transition at 
randomly chosen locations throughout the source volume. 
Such probabilities can be summed over all energy bins (gross counting yield), or summed over energy 
bins that comprise one or more photopeaks in a spectrum (photopeak counting yield). Figure  shows the 
MCNP results summed over photopeaks for various radionuclides. Two different geometries were used 
for 60Co (60 cm radius by 60 cm deep cylinder of water underneath floating detector, and 120 cm radius 
by 120 cm deep cylinder of water underneath floating detector). The 8-fold larger volume increased the 
gross counting yield in the 3×3 floating system for 60Co by some 27%, but only very slightly increased 
the counting yield in the photopeaks by 20%. This indicates that using even larger volumes in the 
calculations would result in very little change in the results. 
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Figure 5. Volume counting yield for full energy events (photopeaks) for the radionuclides in each of the 
four detector configurations. 
The simulated spectra are displayed in Appendix A. As can be seen from these figures the radionuclides 
of interest have readily identifiable spectra, with exception of 90Sr + 90Y, which exhibits no photopeak but 
rather a broad, and relatively weak, x-ray spectrum. The 3×3 detector is always superior to the 2×2 
detector, and generally placing either detector in the sample box yields better sensitivity than when it is 
floating (the only exception is 90Sr + 90Y). The final two figures in this set give show the 226Ra spectra 
with progeny (214Bi and 214Pb) included. These figures differ in that Figure  assumes that none of the 
radon stays in solution in the water, while Figure  assumes that 90% of the radon escapes from the water.  
4.8 Relationship Between MCNP Results and Detection Capabilities 
The relationship between activity, volume, and concentration is 
 ,
V
AC =  
where 
 C = radionuclide concentration (Ci/gal or Bq/m3) 
 A = the activity (Ci or Bq) 
 V = the volume that A is dissolved or suspended in. 
We introduce the concept of volume counting yield, YV, defined as the observed count rate (counts per 
second) per unit concentration (Bq/m3), or (counts/second)/(Bq/m3). This unit can be rearranged to give 
(counts)/(nuclear transition/m3) or (counts × m3)/(nuclear transition). 
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One can derive YV from the MCNP tally results by multiplying the raw tally results summed over 
photopeaks or gross spectra by the source volume. The two floating detector volumes used were 0.68 m3 
(179 gal.) and 5.43 m3 (1434 gal.). The net volume of water in the sampling box was 0.0815 m3 (21.5 
gal.). The YV values are plotted in Figure 5. The amount of activity concentration needed to produce one 
additional count per second above background in either gross counts or in photopeaks for various isotopes 
and four detector configurations is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Activity concentration in Bq/m3 to produce 1 additional count per second above background in 
either gross counts or in photopeaks for various isotopes and four detector configurations. 
   (Bq/m3) to produce 1 additional c/s 
Radionuclide Peak (MeV) 
2x2 
Floating 
2x2 Sample 
Box 
3x3 
Floating 
3x3 Sample 
Box 
Co-60 (normal volume) Peak Total 45,318 19,016 12,278 5,082 
Co-60 (normal volume) Total 2,178 1,478 929 617 
Co-60 (large volume) Peak Total 36,306  10,268  
Co-60 (large volume) Total 1,708  731  
Sr/Y-90 Total Brems 53,371 76,018 25,699 35,766 
Mo-99 Peak Total 16,144 6,530 6,473 2,587 
Mo-99 Total 2,700 1,363 1,211 612 
Tc-99m 1.41E-01 24,212 6,803 10,807 3,030 
Tc-99m Total 3,266 1,236 1,542 590 
I-131 Peak Total 20,964 7,341 7,803 2,672 
I-131 Total 2,382 1,150 1,085 520 
Cs-137 6.62E-01 40,824 14,032 12,239 4,224 
Cs-137 Total 2,327 1,324 1,025 575 
Ir-192 Peak Total 28,113 9,187 10,452 3,365 
Ir-192 Total 2,417 1,144 1,099 519 
Am-241 5.95E-02 73,855 19,738 34,247 9,259 
Am-241 Total 16,443 5,203 7,898 2,519 
Ra-226 1.86E-01 28,108 7,965 12,179 3,449 
Ra-226 Total 3,245 1,308 1,520 619 
Bi-214 Peak Total 29,669 12,952 9,071 4,011 
Bi-214 Total 2,195 1,392 951 593 
Pb-214 Peak Total 24,593 8,785 9,673 3,363 
Pb-214 Total 3,101 1,371 1,429 631 
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Assuming that about one net count per second could be distinguished during a 2 minute count (giving 
about 120 counts greater than background), one can begin to gauge the concentrations of radionuclides 
that these detectors can register. The largest of these numbers (241Am and floating 2×2 detector) is about 2 
microcuries per cubic meter (µCi/m3), or about 0.007 µCi/gal. For the floating 3×3 detector, the numbers 
are about half these values, about 1 µCi/m3 or about 0.004 µCi/gal. In each case, one can see about 6 
times lower concentrations of 60Co than of 241Am. The use of gross count rate may be more sensitive, but 
this depends on background levels. 
Since it was shown in Vol. 1 that a millicurie per gallon produces no more than one rem per hour, these 
detection thresholds show that dose rates well below 0.00001 rem per hour, or 0.01 mrem per hour, could 
be detected with a 2-minute counting time. One can easily detect one curie of any of the listed 
radionuclides dissolved in 10 million gallons of water, a concentration of 0.1 µCi/gal. 
Only for 90Sr + 90Y are the sample box configurations less efficient than the floating detectors. 
4.9 Conclusions from MCNP Calculations 
The use of a submerged or floating NaI(Tl) based detector (2×2 or 3×3) allows effective collection of 
photon spectra from contaminated water. The simulated spectra are readily identifiable with exception of 
90Sr + 90Y. It is not surprising that 90Sr + 90Y is not identifiable given that the mechanism of photon 
production, bremsstrahlung, that has a dependence on the atomic number of the media. In these cases the 
media is water, for which the atomic number of oxygen, 8, is used. While no photopeak characteristic of 
90Sr + 90Y exists, it is possible to determine the presence of a radionuclide contaminant purely based on 
the total detector count rate, dependent on background levels. 
These calculations have demonstrated that deploying such detectors would be useful in providing early 
detection and identification of radionuclides in wastewater. 
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5.0 Recommendations to King County WTD 
 for Radiological Instruments 
Several recommendations are clear from the work to date.  
5.1 Fixed Gamma Spectroscopy Instruments for Early Warning and 
Quantitative Threat Characterization 
Fixed radiation detection instrumentation should be deployed as part of a defense-in-depth system that 
provides early warning of significant radioactive material on the way to the WPTP and monitoring at 
strategic locations within the plant. Such systems should be able to identify the radionuclide(s) and 
provide estimates of the soluble concentrations. 
There is an additional need for detectors capable of functioning in high-dose rate environments that are 
likely under some scenarios. Such detectors must be capable of functioning from 10 microrems per hour 
(background) up to 1000 rems per hour, a full eight orders of magnitude (a factor of 100,000,000). In 
most locations, fixed dose-rate monitors such as area monitors used in nuclear facilities would provide 
high radiation level capabilities in the case of a large, concentrated source in wastewater, either dissolved 
or entrained.  
5.1.1 Early Warning from the Interbay Pump Station 
Early warning is quite feasible. Deployment of a 3” × 3” NaI(Tl) scintillation detector in a floating buoy 
in the wet well of the Interbay Pump Station (Figure ), with a computer workstation in the control room 
would provide the needed capability. Cabling challenges and temperature stabilization can be overcome. 
Results would be telemetered via the Secure wideband communications to all authorized locations, 
including the control room, the South Jackson Street building, and technical support staff off site. 
5.1.2 WPTP Bar Screen Room 
A 3” × 3” NaI(Tl) scintillation detector system should be installed on the pipe beyond the hydraulic ram 
in the rags waste stream in the bar screen room, shown in Figure . This detector should be shielded, and 
shielding should be wrapped around the pipe itself. A high dose rate monitoring system should be 
installed in this location as well. Such a combination of detectors provides sensitive, low-level 
identification and quantification of radioactive materials, and can provide useful information if the low-
level system becomes overwhelmed. 
The high level detector can also serve to detect intact sealed sources that may wind up in the rock box. 
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Figure 6. Proposed detector location (arrow) to monitor the rags waste stream in the discharge pipe from 
the hydraulic ram in the bar screen room at WPTP. 
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5.1.3 Fine Grit Facility 
A dose-rate monitoring system above the collection funnels in the fine grit facility (Figure ) would 
provide warning and radiation level measurements in the event of an RDE that resulted in insoluble 
chunks of radioactive material, as discussed in Vol. 1. 
 
Figure 7. Dose  rate monitoring equipment should be located near the grit collection funnels (bottom of 
photo) in the grit facility 
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5.1.4 Sampling Tank in the Raw Sewage Pump Room 
A 3” × 3” NaI(Tl) scintillation detector system should be installed in the sampling tank in the raw sewage 
pump room (Figure ), along the lines of the design described in Section 4.  
 
Figure 8. Workers inspect the sampling tank in the raw sewage pump room 
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5.1.5 6% Thickened, Blended Sludge Pipes 
A 3” × 3” NaI(Tl) scintillation detector system should be installed downstream of the concentration 
facilities that produce 6% thickened blended sludge on the way to the anerobic digesters. One potential 
location is at a point where the thickened, blended sludge passes through a single pipe (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Arrows indicate potential location inside a 90° elbow for monitoring thickened, blended sludge. 
5.1.6 Engineering Challenges 
Engineering challenges exist for these applications. Explosion-proof, corrosion resistant housings and 
temperature compensation must be designed for detectors. Cable-length challenges may exist for 
delivering power to detectors and retrieving required signals out of potentially explosive and corrosive 
environments. It will be necessary to engineer floating detectors that cannot become dams or become 
excessively fouled with grease between reasonable service intervals, and that can rise and fall with 
varying wastewater levels and flow rates.  
It is also necessary to deploy both ultra-sensitive detectors to provide early warning and identification and 
detectors capable of functioning in high-dose rate environments that are likely under some scenarios, 
capable of functioning from 10 microrems per hour (background) up to 1000 rems per hour, a full eight 
orders of magnitude (a factor of 100,000,000). While such instrumentation exists for other applications, 
all of this engineering will require deploying prototypes and perhaps dealing with unforeseen 
complications.  
Software supporting fixed spectroscopic detectors would be developed to provide prompt, reliable, and 
simple interpretations of spectroscopic outputs that are of use to operators and decision-makers. Software 
to provide scientists and homeland security personnel with sufficient technical detail for identification, 
quantification, waste management decisions, and for the inevitable forensic and attribution needs must be 
developed. Such software is not an off-the-shelf product as of March 2005 but it is expected that, with 
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sufficient resources and collaboration between government agencies, scientists, and vendors, it can be 
specified and developed within two years or less. 
5.2 Portable Instruments 
In addition to fixed instruments, general purpose instruments that can be used to determine the nature and 
extent of radioactive contamination and measure radiation levels for purposes of protecting personnel and 
members of the public should be available to WTD personnel.  
5.2.1. Portable Radioisotope Identifiers (RIIDs) 
One or more portable radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs) should be available to WTD personnel for 
surveying and identifying contaminants in screening waste (rags), grit, and biosolids, as well as anywhere 
else that radioactivity may concentrate. These are not on the list of approved instruments maintained by 
the state of Washington. 
5.2.2 Personal Radiation Monitors 
Small, portable battery-powered personal radiation monitors should be widely available to WTD 
personnel. The personal monitors can be used for personal and group radiation protection decisions, and 
to alert management to the need to get expert backup.  
From the list of state-approved instruments, we recommend that WTD purchase one Item No. 15 (EPD 
Mk2 Dosimeter Reader), one Item No. 16 (Utility Software Site License for EPD Mk2), and as many 
EPD Mk2 Siemens EPD MK2 Dosimeters as needed. If the MK2 is no longer available, then we 
recommend getting the next generation instrument from Siemens. 
5.2.3 Portable, General Purpose Radiological Instruments 
From the state-approved list, we recommend that you purchase one of the Areva/Cogema/ 
Canberra/Aptec/NRC suitcases "Item No. 12" ERKADV (Emergency Response Kit, Advanced) at $7,750 
each. This kit contains a radiation detection instrument (ADM-300) that can handle alpha, beta, and 
gamma detection. WTD probably does not need everything in the kit, so we would focus on the built-in 
detectors and the external GM pancake probe. The XP110 Large Area X-Ray Probe is not needed. 
We also recommend the purchase of 10 to 20 RadAlert “Inspectors,” a multi-purpose GM-based 
instrument that can be operated in the count mode, count rate mode, and in the dose rate mode. 
5.3 Laboratory Instruments 
A liquid scintillation counter that can detect any radioactive materials (alpha-, beta-, and gamma-emitters) 
in water samples should be available for laboratory analysis of samples. Typical liquid scintillation 
counters analyze a 1 mL water sample in 10 mL of “liquid scintillation cocktail,” a mixture of a solvent, 
surfactants, and wavelength-shifting fluors that give off light when ionizing radiation is absorbed by 
them. Such instruments can give very accurate results and can identify and measure radionuclides that do 
not emit gamma or x radiation. 
A liquid scintillation counter is a lower priority than other instruments described above. 
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5.3 Training 
All uses of radiological instrumentation will require training and periodic retraining of personnel, as well 
as periodic calibration and maintenance of instruments. Routine innocent alarms will occur due to 
medical radionuclides that are legally discharged into sanitary sewers on a daily basis. Innocent alarms 
may also be triggered by WTD workers who have recently been treated with medical radioisotopes. 
Instrumentation must provide signals that distinguish between routine medical discharges and off-normal 
occurrences that are due to malicious acts or undetected accidents. Operators and others who deal with 
instrument signals must be prepared to deal with innocent but real alarms, while being vigilant for alarms 
indicating malicious or other serious discharges. 
5.4 Funding 
The King County Wastewater Treatment Division should seek Homeland Security or EPA resources to 
become the model POTW in the U.S. to design, deploy, and test such radiological instrumentation, and 
integrate the use of such instrumentation into its radiological emergency response plan. 
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6.0 Conclusions and Next Steps  
This report is the second of three volumes. The first volume, a radiological risk assessment, contains basic 
information on radiation and radioactive materials, and develops scenarios that could lead to the 
introduction of radioactive material into a combined storm and sanitary sewer system. Vol. 1 analyzes the 
consequences resulting from various scenarios.  
6.1 Conclusions 
Based on the analysis in Volume 1 and a second visit to the King County WTD, this document, Volume 2 
of PNNL-15163, provides an assessment of the radiological instrumentation needs for detection of 
radiological or nuclear terrorism, in support of decisions to treat contaminated wastewater or to bypass the 
West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP), and in support of radiation protection of the workforce, the public, 
and the infrastructure of this POTW.  
Two broad categories of scenarios were considered in Volume 1. The first category includes events that 
may be suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a "dirty bomb" in downtown Seattle. The 
explosion would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., sewer methane gas or RDD) may 
not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to quickly detect the radioisotopes 
listed in Vol. 1, assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if possible) 
detrimental effects resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of about an hour or two 
might be available before any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
The second category includes RDEs that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples 
of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the 
sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging 
apparatus, or moisture density gauges may get into wastewater and be carried to the treatment plant. Other 
scenarios include a terrorist deliberately putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. 
Alternatively, a botched terrorism preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering 
wastewater without anyone's knowledge. Drinking water supplies may also be contaminated, with the 
result that some or most of the radioactivity ends up in wastewater. In these cases, the wastewater 
management and treatment infrastructure may be the first opportunity that government has to detect such 
events. 
Fixed radiation detection instrumentation should be deployed in a defense-in-depth system that provides 
1) early warning of significant radioactive material on the way to the WPTP, including identification of 
the radionuclide(s) and estimates of the soluble concentrations, with a floating detector located in the wet 
well at the Interbay Pump Station and telemetered via the secure wideband communications to all 
authorized locations, 2) monitoring at strategic locations within the plant, including  
a)  the pipe beyond the hydraulic ram in the bar screen room 
b) above the collection funnels in the fine grit facility 
c) in the sampling tank in the raw sewage pump room 
d) downstream of the concentration facilities that produce 6% blended and concentrated biosolids. 
Engineering challenges exist for these applications. Explosion-proof, corrosion resistant housings and 
temperature compensation must be designed for detectors. Cable-length challenges may exist for 
delivering power to detectors and retrieving required signals out of potentially explosive and corrosive 
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environments. It will be necessary to engineer floating detectors that cannot become dams or become 
excessively fouled with grease between reasonable service intervals, and that can rise and fall with 
varying wastewater levels and flow rates. It is also necessary to deploy both ultra-sensitive detectors to 
provide early warning and identification and detectors capable of functioning in high-dose rate 
environments that are likely under some scenarios, capable of functioning from 10 microrems per hour 
(background) up to 1000 rems per hour, a full eight orders of magnitude (a factor of 100,000,000). While 
such instrumentation exists for other applications, all of this engineering will require deploying 
prototypes and perhaps dealing with unforeseen complications.  
Software supporting fixed spectroscopic detectors would be developed to provide prompt, reliable, and 
simple interpretations of spectroscopic outputs that are of use to operators and decision-makers. Software 
to provide scientists and homeland security personnel with sufficient technical detail for identification, 
quantification, waste management decisions, and for the inevitable forensic and attribution needs must be 
developed. Such software is not an off-the-shelf product as of March, 2005, but it is expected that, with 
sufficient resources and collaboration between government agencies, scientists, and vendors, it can be 
specified and developed within two years or less. 
Computational modeling using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software has demonstrated that 
useful detection capabilities can be deployed. In particular, any of the isotopes examined can be detected 
at levels between 0.01 and 0.1 µCi per gallon. Thus, a 1 Ci source dissolved in 10 million gallons of water 
could be detected within minutes. 
In addition to fixed instruments, general purpose instruments that can be used to determine the nature and 
extent of radioactive contamination and measure radiation levels for purposes of protecting personnel and 
members of the public should be available to WTD personnel. One or more portable RIIDs should be 
available to WTD personnel. Small, portable battery-powered personal radiation monitors should be 
widely available to WTD personnel. The personal monitors can be used for personal and group radiation 
protection decisions, and to alert management to the need to get expert backup. 
All uses of radiological instrumentation will require training and periodic retraining of personnel, as well 
as periodic calibration and maintenance of instruments. Routine “innocent” alarms will occur due to 
medical radionuclides that are legally discharged into sanitary sewers on a daily basis. Innocent alarms 
may also be triggered by WTD workers who have recently been treated with medical radioisotopes. 
Instrumentation must provide signals that distinguish between routine medical discharges and off-normal 
occurrences that are due to malicious acts or undetected accidents. Operators and others who deal with 
instrument signals must be prepared to deal with innocent but real alarms, while being vigilant for alarms 
indicating malicious or other serious discharges. 
6.2 Next Steps 
The King County Wastewater Treatment Division should seek Homeland Security resources to become 
the model POTW in the U.S. to design, deploy, and test such radiological instrumentation. 
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Appendix A. MCNP Results 
Appendix A contains graphs of spectra for ten radionuclides, 60Co, 90Sr + 90Y, 99Mo, 99mTc, 131I, 137Cs, 
192Ir, 214Bi, 214Pb, 226Ra, and 241Am that would be observed in each of the four detector configurations 
described in Section 4. Additional drawings of the detector layouts are also shown. 
Table 6 shows the numerical results in cps/(Bq/m3) from the MCNP calculations. 
Table 6. Numerical results in cps/(Bq/m3) from the MCNP calculations for each photopeak, for all 
photopeaks, and for gross counts for various radionuclides. 
Radio-
nuclide Peak (MeV) 2×2 Floating 
2×2 Sample 
Box 3×3 Floating 
3×3 Sample 
Box 
Co-60 1.17E+00 1.31E-05 3.00E-05 4.61E-05 1.09E-04 
 1.33E+00 8.92E-06 2.26E-05 3.54E-05 8.76E-05 
 Peak Total 2.21E-05 5.26E-05 8.14E-05 1.97E-04 
 Total 4.59E-04 6.77E-04 1.08E-03 1.62E-03 
Mo-99 3.66E-01 2.43E-05 5.58E-05 5.19E-05 1.22E-04 
 1.41E-01 1.85E-05 5.01E-05 4.34E-05 1.13E-04 
 1.81E-01 7.64E-06 1.52E-05 1.92E-05 4.04E-05 
 7.40E-01 1.15E-05 3.20E-05 4.00E-05 1.11E-04 
 Peak Total 6.19E-05 1.53E-04 1.54E-04 3.87E-04 
 Total 3.70E-04 7.33E-04 8.26E-04 1.64E-03 
Tc-99m 1.41E-01 4.13E-05 1.47E-04 9.25E-05 3.30E-04 
 Total 3.06E-04 8.09E-04 6.49E-04 1.69E-03 
I-131 7.23E-01 1.40E-05 3.16E-05 3.70E-05 8.20E-05 
 2.84E-01 3.12E-05 9.78E-05 8.31E-05 2.69E-04 
 6.37E-01 2.02E-06 5.64E-06 6.43E-06 1.88E-05 
 3.64E-01 5.09E-07 1.22E-06 1.67E-06 4.35E-06 
 Peak Total 4.77E-05 1.36E-04 1.28E-04 3.74E-04 
 Total 4.20E-04 8.70E-04 9.21E-04 1.92E-03 
Cs-137 6.62E-01 2.45E-05 7.13E-05 8.17E-05 2.37E-04 
 Total 4.30E-04 7.55E-04 9.76E-04 1.74E-03 
Ir-192 6.04E-01 2.52E-05 7.96E-05 6.50E-05 2.08E-04 
 4.68E-01 8.45E-06 2.31E-05 2.39E-05 6.93E-05 
 3.17E-01 1.89E-06 6.15E-06 6.75E-06 1.99E-05 
 Peak Total 3.56E-05 1.09E-04 9.57E-05 2.97E-04 
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Radio-
nuclide Peak (MeV) 2×2 Floating 
2×2 Sample 
Box 3×3 Floating 
3×3 Sample 
Box 
 Total 4.14E-04 8.74E-04 9.10E-04 1.93E-03 
Am-241 5.95E-02 1.35E-05 5.07E-05 2.92E-05 1.08E-04 
 Total 6.08E-05 1.92E-04 1.27E-04 3.97E-04 
Ra-226 1.86E-01 3.56E-05 1.26E-04 8.21E-05 2.90E-04 
 Total 3.08E-04 7.64E-04 6.58E-04 1.62E-03 
Bi-214 1.38E+00 1.49E-05 3.87E-05 4.81E-05 1.23E-04 
 7.68E-01 5.35E-06 1.06E-05 1.67E-05 3.11E-05 
 1.12E+00 6.41E-06 1.25E-05 1.99E-05 4.13E-05 
 1.76E+00 3.51E-06 7.77E-06 1.28E-05 2.52E-05 
 6.09E-01 3.51E-06 7.60E-06 1.28E-05 2.89E-05 
 Peak Total 3.37E-05 7.72E-05 1.10E-04 2.49E-04 
 Total 4.56E-04 7.19E-04 1.05E-03 1.69E-03 
Pb-214 2.42E-01 1.27E-05 3.02E-05 2.97E-05 7.41E-05 
 2.95E-01 1.37E-05 3.73E-05 3.50E-05 9.69E-05 
 3.52E-01 1.43E-05 4.63E-05 3.87E-05 1.26E-04 
 Peak Total 4.07E-05 1.14E-04 1.03E-04 2.97E-04 
 Total 3.23E-04 7.30E-04 7.00E-04 1.58E-03 
Co-60 
(large 
volume) 
1.17E+00 1.58E-05 5.45E-05 
 1.33E+00 1.18E-05 4.29E-05 
 Peak Total 2.75E-05 9.74E-05 
 Total 5.85E-04 1.37E-03 
 
39 
 
Figure 10.  60Co Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
Figure 11. 60Co Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
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Figure 12. 90Sr/Y Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
 
Figure 13. 99Mo Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 14. 99Mo Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 15. 99mTc Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 16. 99mTc Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 3. 131I Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 4.  131I Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 19. 137Cs Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 20. 137Cs Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 21. 192Ir Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 22. 192Ir Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 23. 241Am Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 24. 241Am Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 25. 226Ra Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 26. 226Ra Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 27. 214Bi Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 5. 214Bi Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 6. 214Pb Detector Comparison. (Linear Scale) 
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Figure 30. 214Pb Detector Comparison. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 31. 226Ra plus Progeny Detector Comparison, Radon Escape Fraction=0. (Log Scale) 
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Figure 32. 226Ra plus Progeny Detector Comparison, Radon Escape Fraction=0.5. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 33. 226Ra plus Progeny Detector Comparison, Radon Escape Fraction=0.9. (Log Scale) 
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Figure 34. 226Ra plus Progeny Detector Comparison, Radon Escape Fraction=1. (Log Scale) 
 
Figure 35. Multi Nuclide Detector Comparison. 3×3 Sample Box Detector 
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Figure 36. Multi Nuclide Detector Comparison. 3×3 Floating Detector 
 
Figure 37. Multi Nuclide Detector Comparison. 2×2 Sample Box Detector 
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Figure 38. Multi Nuclide Detector Comparison. 2×2 Floating Detector 
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Figure 7. Floating detector cross section. Dark blue is NaI(Tl), yellow is water, 
light blue is rubber, green is PVC, magenta is aluminum. Dots in water 
represent locations of individual nuclear transitions. 
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Figure 40. Floating detector horizontal cross section through sodium iodide crystal. Dark blue is NaI(Tl), 
light blue is rubber, green is PVC. 
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Figure 8. Sample box detector cross section seen from end. Red is 
NaI(Tl), green is PVC, light blue is water, white is dry air, yellow 
is aluminum. Dots in water represent locations of individual 
nuclear transitions in all planes, i.e., in front of and behind the 
detector suspended in the water. 
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Figure 9. Sample box detector cross section seen from side. Red is NaI(Tl), green is PVC, 
light blue is water, dark blue is water at 50% density (that is, frothy, foamy water spilling 
over the top of the overflow), white is dry air, yellow is aluminum. Dots in water represent 
locations of individual nuclear transitions in all planes, i.e., in front of and behind the 
detector suspended in the water. 
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Figure 10. Sample box detector cross section (through detector) seen from top. Red is NaI(Tl), 
green is PVC, light blue is water, dark blue is water at 50% density (that is, frothy, foamy water 
spilling over the top of the overflow), white is dry air, yellow is aluminum. Dots in water 
represent locations of individual nuclear transitions in all planes, i.e., in front of and behind the 
detector suspended in the water. 
 
